Canadian Forces/RMC Interface - Withers Report

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Report of the RMC Board of Governors By the Withers' Study Group
Balanced Excellence Leading Canada's Armed Forces In The New Millenium
4500-240 (ADM (HR-Mil))
24 September 1998

The Study Group's findings and recommendations are grouped below beginning with the CF/RMC interface and recruiting, then proceeding through the four pillars. A complete description of the Balanced Excellence Model for the RMC of the 21st Century is found in the section entitled The Way Ahead.

Cross-reference p. 24 of 63 of official printed copy of report

Our investigations determined that a significant portion of the problems identified at RMC derive from the greater CF community. The Services which are stakeholders of RMC do not act as stakeholders. For example, the Navy frankly admits that it virtually ignored the College over the past several years and made no attempt to send its best people there. The situation with the Army and Air Force is only modestly better. There is no readily apparent or sustained communication between the CF and the College. The silence from NDHQ staff, other than the Personnel Group, is echoed by the three Services. Visits by senior officers or operational commanders are relatively unusual, and normally involve ceremonial functions, or the appearance of convenience or afterthought. By comparison, the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army and the U.S. Chief of the Naval Staff are regular visitors to West Point and Annapolis, delivering substantive messages to sizeable groups concerning leadership, operations and other service developments.

Numerous speakers do appear at the College. These occasions are worthwhile and should continue. However, they normally address a specific academic class or small groups.

Regular appearances by senior operational commanders and staff at RMC would serve two essential purposes. First, cadets would receive first hand evidence that they, and the institution they attend, are important to the CF and its future. Second, senior CF officers could provide regular updates on what the forces are doing, what future plans and requirements are contemplated and how RMC contributed to these issues. These real world "reality checks" would help convince cadets that they are preparing for a dynamic, relevant role in service to the Forces and to Canada.

RMC must act as an institution promoting a common understanding of the requirements of the CF as a whole. The College must also promote a common vision of the profession of arms, the common military ethos underpinning leadership in the CF and the increasingly joint nature of all foreseeable operations. Indoctrination into the three separate environments is a process to be undertaken by the services after MOC selection and should largely be accomplished during training and education, off campus.

Today RMC graduates account for 25% of the officer intake of the CF. Two considerations led the Study Group to reflect on the desirability of increasing this proportion. First, given the focussed energy and resources applied at RMC to the production of superior officers, it would seem logical that an increase in the percentage of such officers would be welcome. Second, it may be that some of the negative assessment of the College and its graduates derive from the fact that there are so few of them. The critical mass necessary for its graduates to have a meaningful impact on the overall culture of the CF officer corps is missing. An officer corps receiving a significantly larger number of its officers from RMC would certainly be more involved in what went on in this institution.

There is no doubt that a healthy CF officer corps results from a mix of different types of officers from various entry schemes- civilian ROTP, UTPO, CFR and DEO. This should remain the model. However, we see considerable merit in increasing the proportion of RMC officers in the CF to approximately 35-40%. This increase can be achieved in a number of ways. One of the attractive features of the Balanced Excellence Model is that such an increase flows naturally from its adoption.

Full consideration of the interface required the Study Group to examine the needs of the "Total Force". It is government policy that the CF will meet operational needs, both at home and abroad, with the combined resources of its regular and reserve components. Thus up to 25% of those serving in Bosnia have been reservists. Ship's companies of the Maritime Coastal Defence Vessel Fleet are virtually completely drawn from Reserve Naval Divisions. Reservists have been called out, in large numbers, for three recent disaster relief operations in Canada. Several of the CF's most senior officers told the Study Group of the importance of the Reserves.

Clearly the Reserves have become a vital, integral element of our defence capability. It follows, therefore, that the Reserves should benefit from the presence in their active ranks of RMC graduates.

Currently a small percentage of annual appointments is assigned to Reserve Entry Training Plan (RETP) candidates. These individuals either pay their way or receive a scholarship from some source. Unlike regular entrants, RETP candidates have no period of subsequent obligatory service. Furthermore the small number who can immediately graduate to primary reserve service is far less than what could reasonably be expected for infusion into this vital element of the total force.

The Balanced Excellence Model, which would increase the number graduating, is well suited to the production of an increased contribution of well trained junior officers to the Reserves.

RETP conditions of service should be revised to make them more attractive for the individual and more useful for the CF. For instance there could be a scheme in which the RETP candidate would receive the same pay and benefits as his/her regular force counterpart. While attending RMC, and, upon graduation, be obligated to a term of primary reserve service equal to twice the length of the regular. Should subsequent employment imperatives for the reservist require a move which would make continued active reserve service impossible, the balance of the obligatory period could be "cashed-out".

Staffing priority for employment at RMC is low. Neither the Services nor individual officers necessarily view an appointment to RMC as a career-enhancing move. These two points give rise to concerns about the quality of these role models. Squadron commanders are sometimes too young and lack experience. Furthermore, they receive absolutely no training or even preparation for the roles and responsibilities they are to assume. Selection criteria such as language and gender are no doubt important; however, additional criteria like aptitude, operational experience, maturity and training skills need to be added to the equation.

Finally, on the matter of staffing, full advantage should be taken of the opportunities presented by application of the total force principle to the College. There are many reservists, particularly those whose civilian employment is in education and federal or provincial public service, who would be well suited and, potentially, available for specific periods on relatively short notice to all positions in all four pillars. As well as meeting RMC's needs, they would serve as Reserves role models.

The Canadian Forces do not seem to consider RMC as their military university. It is absolutely essential that the Forces view the College as an instrument of prime importance to ensure excellence. They should collaborate most closely with the accomplishment of its mission and the College should become an object of pride.

To assist in achieving this vital objective, the following recommendations are offered:

Recommendation 2: Strengthen military pillar staff resources.

a. Review staffing priorities for employment at RMC. Selected officers must want to be there, provide exemplary role models and view the job as a career plus. The Board must ensure that the Commandant's veto over proposed staff is an effective one. The Commandant must not have to choose the least weak, but rather the best of the strong;

b. Develop a clear comprehensive Terms of Reference Document on the role and responsibilities of a RMC squadron commander. Comment: This document should include desired qualifications and attributes, together with selection criteria and recommendations for pre-training. The Board should ensure these TORs are accepted and applied by ADM(Per).

Recommendation 3: Fully integrate RMC into the regular command structure of the CF.

a. Communicate CF requirements on a routine basis to RMC. Comment: This begins with a clear statement of the strategic context and the roles and missions of the CF. Beyond this, recommendations with regard to specific programs and military training objectives need to be communicated to the College on a regular basis. Conversely, RMC's concerns need to be communicated to the highest levels of the Senior Leadership. To achieve this goal Armed Forces Council should schedule regular meetings with the Board and senior leadership at RMC. This schedule should include visits of AFC to the College at least once per year;

b. Establish a coherent, regular and focused visit program starting with the MND and CDS/DM on down. Visitors and speakers must include Chiefs of Staff of the three services, senior NDHQ staff officers and a range of operational commanders of all ranks. Comment: The visitor/speaker program must target the Cadet Wing as a whole. For reasons of time and space, this might be organised by year group or service as appropriate. These visits must be fully integrated into the academic and military pillars.

Recommendation 4:

Ensure that inter-service boundaries and parochial concerns do not unduly erode the capability of RMC to develop officers whose military ethos reflects their primary responsibility as professional CF officers.

Recommendation 5:

Seek through the MND and the Armed Forces Council to increase the percentage of RMC graduates in the CF officer corps from the current 25% to approximately 35-40%. Comment: Accomplish this goal by fixing the first year intake at approximately 1.6 times its present level.

Recommendation 6:

Apply the "Total Force" principle by increasing the number graduating to primary reserve service and making beneficial use of CF Reserves assets in staffing. Comment: Accomplish this by increasing the slots assigned for cadets, revising RETP conditions of service and employing qualified reservists on the staff.

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