Report of the RMC Board of Governors By the Withers' Study Group
Balanced Excellence Leading Canada's Armed Forces In The New Millenium
4500-240 (ADM (HR-Mil))
24 September 1998
Cross-reference p. 12 of 63 of official printed copy of report
In a period of great turbulence and instability, it is instructive to return to first principles to confirm the basis upon which we are training and educating professional military officers. The first issue therefore, is the nature of the profession of arms. One of the better definitions is that of General Sir John Hackett (in The Profession of Arms). According to General Hackett, the function of the profession of arms in the modern state system is the ordered application of military force in pursuit of a social goal or value. The key phrases are "ordered application", implying professional standards, strategic analysis and sound doctrine; and "pursuit of a social goal", implying overall civilian political control.
If applying military force is what a professional military officer does, what then comprises the unique qualifications to fulfil this function? Samuel Huntington has provided one of the more useful definitions in The Soldier and the State. In a generic sense any activity purporting to achieve professional status must require expertise, reflect corporateness and demonstrate social responsibility. Taken together the body of knowledge, unique traditions and practices internal to the activity and the values conditioning its conduct, delineate the profession in question from all others in society.
This model applies superbly to the profession of arms. In this case the expertise in question demands both a broad liberal education and a body of more esoteric, often technical, knowledge necessary to effectively apply military force in an ordered manner. A broad liberal education is necessary to ensure the professional officer responds naturally to political and societal norms and goals which ultimately control his/her conduct. Social responsibility involves incorporating ethical standards and practices which, no matter how they are modified to accommodate the unique nature of the military profession, must reflect the society in which the profession is embedded. These responsibilities are contained in the body of knowledge making up the officer's expertise. The unique corporate nature of the profession is defined in part by which particular social responsibilities are accepted and the precise manner in which they are executed.
The corporate identity of the military profession is defined by many elements. Paramount among these, according to Huntington, are the acceptance of a contract of unlimited liability and selfless devotion to service and country. Sustaining these commitments are a thorough awareness of one's military history and the traditions and practices accumulated and manifested through regimental and unit custom and lore. In the Canadian case, these elements are bound together by virtue of the individual's service in the all encompassing, integrated whole, that is the Canadian Forces.
The expertise required of a professional military officer varies over time and is dependant on the roles assigned the military in any given society. Clearly British military officers in the 19th Century, policing a global empire in the early days of the Industrial Revolution, required different knowledge and skills than allied officers prosecuting the Gulf War in 1991. However, whatever this body of knowledge is, it represents a key determinant in what makes an officer self-consciously aware of the corporate nature of his/her profession.
For Canadian officers in the new millennium, the required expertise will include, but not be restricted to, knowledge of the nature and origins of military theory, and how it influences operations and doctrine. For example, officers should be aware of the bipolar Clausewitzian model of strategy (refined by the German military historian Hans Delbruk). With its two components, the strategy of destruction and the strategy of attrition, this model underpins the modern theory of limited war, the doctrine of massive retaliation and pervades today's emerging concept of "operations short of war". The military thought of Jomini, Moltke, Mahan, Corbett, Svechin, Tukachevsky, Fuller, Aron, Brodie and Osgoode, among others, is essential in understanding the true nature of the military profession.
Beyond theory lies the whole field of strategy, operations and tactics. Notwithstanding Moltke's contention that strategy is a simple matter of common sense, modern strategy is a complex multi-dimensional subject demanding careful study. A useful justification for this conclusion is contained in the U.S. Army War College essay "Why is Strategy Difficult?" by Professor David Jablonsky. Military officers should be exposed to this analysis, as well as many similar discussions, at an early stage.
The incorporation of the concept of operational art into Western Anglo-American and French doctrines, beginning in the 1980s, has created a new area of professional study, heavily dependant on military theory, military history and the study of major military campaigns.
Officers learn applied tactics through training and experience. Nonetheless, in the modern era the impact of technology on doctrine and through it, tactics, raises unprecedented intellectual issues. The professional officer must combine theory and practice to achieve the levels of competence demanded by modern war and other forms of armed conflict.
Officers acquire their professional knowledge over the span of a complete career. Their knowledge becomes more complete, sophisticated and extensive over time. Thus operational theory is normally studied at the Staff College level and effective knowledge of civil/military relations is best developed over a series of progressively more senior appointments. The role of a military university in this process needs to be carefully thought through. How much, of what, is enough, at the outset of an officer's career has not been definitively established in any force. Certainly however, officer trainees need a fairly comprehensive introduction to the profession of arms and its component parts. In post-industrial, liberal democracies this introduction includes extensive studies of the humanities and solid grounding in the sciences. In addition, the study of military theory and military history is mandatory.
The situation of the military profession is analogous to that of the medical or legal professions. Potential candidates must, in the first instance, be accredited by the profession's governing body. In the case of the Canadian military this formal accreditation occurs when the Queen's Commission is bestowed upon an officer. At this first stage of the officer's professional development they must possess a certain body of professionally relevant knowledge, a keen understanding of the corporate nature of their profession and a thorough awareness of the social responsibilities it entails.
RMC is the ideal place to carry out this accreditation process. All cadets should graduate with a clear conception of their professional status in the profession of arms based on extensive common knowledge of those subjects which constitute their unique expertise. The wider "corporation" of the CF will have been thoroughly introduced and their formal commitment to service and country rooted in a detailed conception of their social responsibilities.